Responsible Theorizing and the Public

A recent article in Perspectives on Politics takes up the issue of the responsibility theorists bear for the results of their theories. There is a lot in this article, and I suggest reading it (if you can get access through your local academic library). I am mainly interested with the big ideas presented in the paper, but one could easily find a lot to say about just about every step of a very well thought out and clearly articulated argument like this.

The author,Piki Ish-Shalom , advocates a new structure for theory:

The first is to determine if intrinsic features of theory act as enabling factors of the political abuses. If such intrinsic features do exist then a second stage is required: looking for corrective measures to these intrinsic features that can alter the vulnerability of theories and diminish the possibility of future political abuses. Theorists should also consider if those corrective measures can be borne. The third stage would be to try to implement the corrective measures to amend the vulnerability of theories to politicization and political abuse.

The article is fascinating to me for a couple of reasons. First, I think it made me realize that some social science theories do make it into the real world policy realm, but often in a watered-down and unrecognizable form. Examples often come from international relations world (the Bush doctrine, the Domino theory, etc.), but one can see the influence of different social science theories shaping domestic policy as well–including education policy¹.

Even more interestingly, Ish-Shalom calls for theorists to abandon the objective ethic for a normative ethic in their theories. That is, he wants theorists to be explicit about the moral implications of their theories and to the limits of interpreting their theories. In other words, he wants theorists to say things like: “In no way does this theory endorse or justify a first strike against an enemy that does not pose a direct threat.” By doing this theorists own the moral implications of their theory and do not leave it to the untrained and imprecise hands of politicians to draw their own moral conclusions from the theory.

I applaud this step and would like to echo this call for a more normative component to theorizing. After all, theorizing is often implicitly normative while hiding behind objectivity to gain authority. Unlike other scientific theories, social science theories can rarely be falsified, and so the objectivity they purport to have is at best tenuous and at worst a sham. Surrendering this in the name of gaining more control of the impact these theories have on real world actions seems like a desirable trade-off².

While I agree with Ish-Shalom that theorists need to be cognizant of the impact their theories can have on shaping political discourse and providing what he calls “rhetorical capital” to policy makers (isn’t that a great phrase?), it got me thinking about those on the receiving end of the politicians’ interpretations of these theories. Will the people–in a democracy ostensibly voters judging policy decisions–be able to tell the difference between a theorists explicit normative claims for his/her theory, and the version presented by politicians? Will the public listen to the debate between the politician and the theorist?

I am skeptical that theorists have much ability to pursue the methods Ish-Shalom lays out:

… theorists will contribute to public understanding by helping science correspondent[s] explain theories by simplifying them rather than trivializing them. A fifth limited measure is that theorists will take notice when their theories are being used politically, evaluate the moral implications of these uses, and, if necessary, act as whistleblowers, warning the public of the dangers posed by the misrepresentations of their theories

Who will listen?  Social science literacy among the public lags much further behind literacy in the hard sciences among the public (which isn’t too stellar in the US). Subtle, but key, differences between the politician’s interpretation and the theorist’s declaration of her theory may be lost on the public either for being uninteresting, too technical, or simply immaterial to the daily life of voters. If this is the case it becomes difficult to ask theorists to be more normative and to be champions of their theories when they cannot find an audience that is tuned in or engaged³. Instead, they will prefer to remain objective, because their guaranteed audience–other theorists–prefer this manner of discourse.

This means that bringing about this shift to normativity is really about shifting the focus away from a dialogue within the fields of social sciences to one between social science and society⁴. This has been advocated by various American theorists time and time again (most notably the progressives like Herbert Croly and John Dewey ), and social scientists have always been reluctant to take on this new and more challenging role.

Yet, it seems clear that the time has come for social scientists to become more public intellectuals, to become champions of their theories, to develop a discourse with the society they are theorizing about. This means generating interest in their work by explaining it more clearly, more concisely, and relating it to the real world more explicitly.

Obviously one way to do this would be for social scientists to improve their presence on the web. I will write a further post on this later, as it seems to be an issue that needs to be discussed more thoroughly.